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ABSTRACT 
Billions of dollars are sperit worldwide on agricultural 
credit programs, yet few comprehensive evaluations exist. This 
paper reviews several methodological issues involved in measur-
ing the farm level impact of agricultural loans. Fungibility 
of loan funds, farm-household interdependence, and the attribu-
tion problem are three issues which are reviewed in detail. A 
farm resource allocation model is used to analyze expected im-
pact of loans on the farm. Recent descriptive, econometric 
and mathematical programming studies of loan impact in low in-
come countries are reviewed relative tQ these issues and the 
resource allocation model. Suggestions are given for improved 
research and data collection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Expansion of formal agricultural credit has been a major 
policy in many low income countries in recent years. In Latin 
America alone, formal agricultural credit was almost $8 bil-
lion in 1973 and the current amount in all low income coun-
tries could range from $30 to $40 billion [25]. Given con-
cessionary interest rates, high administrative costs, and low 
repayment rates, substantial subsidies are required to con-
tinue this policy in many countries. There is growing con-
cern, however, that this credit has not led to desired improve-
ments in farm income, production and income distribution. 
This paper reviews selected studies of the impact of 
agricultural credit programs. The objective is to summarize 
key conceptual problems and analyze important methodological 
alternatives.l/ We first briefly present a conceptual frame-
work of the potential impact of credit on farm resource allo-
cation. This framework is used to identify general methodo-
logical problems encountered in empirical research. The sec-
ond section reviews the empirical literature including des-· 
criptive, econometric, and mathematical programming studies. 
Finally, research suggestions are given to improve estimates 
of benefits obtained from agricultural 6redit programs. 
1/ An annotated bibliography of publications reviewed for this 
paper is available [16]. 
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ROLE OF CREDIT IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
An important proolem in analysis of the impact of borrow-
ing on a farm-household is the lack of a sound theoretical 
framework to guide empirical research.~/ Errors in specifi-
cation of empirical models and misinterpretation of results 
are logical outcomes. Two issues are particularly troublesome. 
First, farm households are complex units simultaneously mak-
ing production and consumption decisions. Secondly, given 
fungibility in farm-household cash flow management, it is dif-
ficult to identify the effects of loans on the farm versus 
the household. But, since formal credit is usually intended 
to increase production, not consumption, many researchers 
assume that production loans are actually used for production. 
It is necessary, as a result, to present a conceptual role of 
credit in farm production as background for the research review. 
Consider the typical neo-classical farm production model 
with a savings constraint represented by S. Given product price 
P, input prices Pi's, and continuous, twice diTferentiable pro-
duction function f(X1, X2 ... Xn), the farm is assumed to maxi-
mize profits subject to the condition that production costs 
not exceed savings. The profit equation is: 
2/ This issue is discussed in greater detail in another 
paper [17]. 
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where A is the Lagrange multiplier. The equilibrium condi-
tions are: 
Pfi = Pi(l+A), whe~e fi is the marginal product for each 
input i from 1 to n, and 
Normally, A is assumed zero and the farm equates marginal value 
product to input price. When savings are limited, A denotes 
the farmer's marginal time preference for present over future 
consumption or, if a financial market exists, the effective 
cost of borrowing. Optimal input use, output, and net farm 
income are expected to be lower when A is not zero.11 
The implications of these equilibrium conditions on farm 
resource allocation are shown in Figures la and lb relating 
output to input Xi and marginal value product of Xi, respec-
tively, assuming the usual ceteris paribus conditions. With 
no financial constraint, optimal levels of output and input 
use are Q* and X1*, respectively. Financial constraints, im-
perfect knowledge and risk factors may cause departure from 
these optima1·1evels. Assuming perfect knowledge and certainty, 
0 
inpu·t usage of Xi and production of Q0 implies an effective 
cost of credit or marginal time preference between present and 
future consumption of A. A credit program which lowers the 
Baker hypothesized that financial constraints may have an 
effect on relative input costs and, therefore, relative 
factor use, e.g., capital becomes relatively more expensive 
than labor [7]. However, fungibility of money or credit 
reduces this effect. 
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effective cost of borrowing to r increases optimum input use to 
X~, production to Q', and net farm income by YXZ. The increase 
in net farm income represents the benefit of borrowing to the 
individual farm. Private benefits equal social benefits if 
r is the equilibrium interest rate determined by market forces. 
The empirical measurement of the total benefits of bor-
rowing is much more complex than implied by this simplified 
model. Focusing on the farm rather than the farm-household 
ignores possible welfare effects of borrowing through increases 
in consumption and non-farm activities. The true effect of 
borrowi~g is the additionality which occurs in farm input 
use and output but, due to fungibility, loans from a formal pro-
gram may simply substitute for own savings or other sources of 
loans [34, 45]. Accounting for substitution, however, may im-
prove measurement of the impact of loans on the farm, but may 
understate the overall impact on the farm-household. If no 
impact can be detected on the farm, the additional liquidity 
due to credit may have substituted for savings or other loan 
sources or diverted to other non-farm or household uses. A 
more complete evaluation requires information about the house-
hold's marginal use of additional liquidity obtained from bor-
rowing, not just the impact of the di~ect expenditure of loans. 
Such information is extremely difficult to collect through 
the typical cross-sectional farm surveys usually conducted for 
this evaluation. 
Even with more comprehensive data, the problem remains of 
isolating the effect of loans on observed differences between 
I j i 
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borrowers and non-borrowers or before and after borrowing. 
has been referred to recently as the attribution problem [34]. 
At least four factors other than credit can explain differences 
between borrowing and nonborrowing households: 
1. differences in shifters of the production functions, 
such as technology, technical information, irrigation, 
weather, and other variables not easily quantified 
in production models; 
2. differences in factors explaining nonoptimal input 
use, such as yield and price uncertainty, and 
management ability; 
3. differences in product and input prices; and 
4. differences in own financial constraints or savings. 
Multipurpose agricultural credit programs contribute to 
the attribution problem. Although credit is the central part 
of these programs, intensive extension services and input sub-
sidies are frequently involved. Many studies assume that ex-
tension explains little of the differences found between bor-
4/ 
rowers and nonborrowers.- H?wever, the effect of input subsi-
dies on input use and production may be significant and needs 
to be separated from the impact of credit. 
Concessionary interest rates, characteristic of most credit 
programs, further complicate research.- The resulting excess de-
mand for loans implies non-price rationing which typically favors 
~/ The study by Scobie and Franklin represents one of the few 
systematic attempts to evaluate extension in supervised 
credit programs. 
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large loans to farmers with greater factor endowments, access 
to better technical information and better management. There-
fore, borrowers may be systematically different from nonborrowers 
with borrowing the result rather than the cause. 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Surprisingly little research has evaluated the impact of 
the vast sums spent on agricultural credit programs. For ex-
ample, the comprehensive 1973 AID Spring Review contained about 
60 papers describing various credit programs but no papers sys-
tematically assessed the farm level impact of loans [3 ]. Some 
studies reported trends in aggregate output, use of inputs, 
and adoption of new varieties, while lamenting the scarcity 
of data to conduct more detailed analysis. This section 
analyzes selected studies concerning the farm level impact of 
borrowing. 
Descriptive Studies 
The most common analysis of credit programs is the compar-
ison of farm input, production, and productivity before and 
after borrowing by borrowers or between borrowers and non-bor-
rowers. Few descriptive studies are widely available, but 
many undoubtedly exist as unpublished reports or graduate stu-
dent theses. Table 1 summarizes the results of selected des-
criptive studies to illustrate the variables examined and the 
impact usually attributed to borrowing. Additional analysis 
was performed using econometric techniques (Colombia) or by 
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TABLE 1: Percent Differences in Selected Measures Between Borrowers 
and Nonborrowers, Selected Countries 
Percent Differences in: 
Operatinr, Invest- Produc-
No. of Expenses ment ti on 
Countries/Years Obs er- Farm per per per 
vat ions Size Hecta.!'e Hectare Hectare 
Brazil (1965) 132 78 112 n.a. 30~1 
Southern Brazil (1965) 954 94 127 80 62~1 (1969) 732 68 281 338 133~1 
Colombia (1968) b/ 52 74 104 n.a. 6 (1968/1965)- 25 30 56 n.a. 35 
Guatemala (1975) 1600 5 39 n.a. -3 
Philippines (1975-1977)~; 577 16 15 n.a. n.a. 
497 2 -15 n.a. n.a. 
Korea 0970) 438 3 5 5 n.a. 
Taiwan (1965, 1970, 1975) 1373 16 21 n.a. 8 
~/Gross farm income per hectare. 
£1comparison of borrowers before (1965) and after (1968) the credit program. 
~1Based on lower 75 percent of farms in size. 
£/Nonborrowers include those who borrowed from non-formal institutions. 
e/ 
- Comparison of borrowers fron non-formal sources and nonborrowers. 
·- :;: .: .. 
Net Farm 
Income 
per 
Hectare 
2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
o~/ 
4 
0 
-1 
-2 
Sources: Brazil [6Ji Southern Brazil [38], Colombia [13], Guatemala (15], Philippines [14], 
and Korea L30]. The Taiwan figures were computed from time series, cross section 
farm household record-keeping data available at the Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, Ohio State University . 
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investigating factors affecting demand for credit (Korea, 
Brazil). 
Except for Colombia, these studies were cross-sectional 
analyses of borrowers and non-borrowers.21 Longitudinal data 
from panel farms would minimize some attribution problems, but 
would magnify the influence of weather, insects and diseases 
which often dominate year to year yield variations. "Before 
and after" comparisons are fewer because evaluation is generally 
initiated after the program begins so quantification of the 
"before" situation is based on questionable farmer recall. 
These studies represent widely different types of agricul-
ture and credit programs. The Latin American studies cover 
relatively large farms producing multiple crops and programs 
including both short and medium term loans. Asian studies re-
fer to small monoculture rice farms receiving only short-term 
credit. Despite these differences, several common patterns 
emerge. Borrowers had larger farms than non-borrowers: 68 to 
94 percent larger in Brazil and Colombia, respectively. Farm 
size differences in Asian countries varied only from 2 to 16 
percent. The Guatemalan farms were of similar size due to the 
sampling procedure. Operating expenses and investment per hec-
tare were higher for borrowers, but production differences were 
less marked. Moreover, net farm income per hectare, when 
5/ In the Philippines and Taiwan, the data included several 
years, but the sample changed from one year to another. 
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reported, was roughly the same.-
Inferences about impact of loans must be treated with cau-
' 
tion due to the attribution problem. Small differences in pro-
.· I 
duction and net farm income do not necessarily imply that borrow- ~ 
ing leads to misallocation or that loans have been diverted. 
The impact of loans is ordinarily expected to be overstated in 
simple comparisons of selected variables. 71 However, uncontrolled 
production problems (bad weather, insects, etc.) may cause un-
derestimation as ex post yields are lower than ex ante yields 
for borrowers using high levels of inputs. Thus, net profits 
per hectare may be similar for both groups or higher for non-
borrowers. 
Daines used sampling and a decomposition technique to re-
duce attribution errors. The sampling procedure was designed 
to control for potential effects of farm size and region-related 
factors. Differences in value of production between borrowers 
and nonborrowers were decomposed into price, yield, crop mix, 
and crop area effects. The contribution of each factor was 
estimated by calculating the-effect if only one factor varied, 
QI Analyzing these variables on a total farm basis is more rele-
vant when farm size can be influenced by credit. Analysis 
per hectare implicitly assumes a fixed land input which is 
most appropriate for Asian countries where land is more 
constrained [23]. 
II It is interesting to note, for example, the significantly dif-
ferent results obtained in the Colombian study between the 
borrower-nonborrower and before-after credit comparisons. 
Borrowers' input use and yield per hectare is 104 percent and 
6 percent higher, respectively, than nonborrowers. But for 
borrowers, input use per hectare increased only by 56 percent 
and yield per hectare rose 35 percent after borrowing. 
!•\ 
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implicitly assuming independence among factors and constant re-
turns to scale. Daines concluded that the substantial expansion 
in crop area, which explains most production differences, was 
largely due to credit. 
A decomposition technique was also used in a World Bank 
evaluation of projects providing medium and long term credit 
to crop farms in the Philippines, Pakistan, and Morocco and 
to livestock farms in Uruguay and Mexico [45]. Crop production 
changes were accounted for by changes in cultivated area, crop-
ping intensity and yields, and changes in livestock production 
by changes in breeding cattle, feeders, reproduction rates and 
beef yields. Judgements were made about the probable effects 
of the project on each source of growth. For example, on 
crop farms loans were assumed to explain 20, 75, and 100 percent 
of the increases in yields, cropping intensity, and cultivated 
area, respectively. Adjustments were also made for the possible 
effect of other loan sources. The study concluded that the 
projects raised crop production by 67 percent instead of the 
observed unadjusted 82 percent. 
The World Bank study also dealt with substitution by spe-
culating on the farm investment that would have occurred with-
out the project or, conversely, the additional farm investment 
due to the project. Three sources of information were used 
to derive an adjustment factor. First, borrowers were asked 
to estimate the investments they would have made without the 
program and the probable source of finance. Second, investments 
between borrowers and nonborrowers were compared. Third, assets 
12 
financed by the project were related to the borrowers' total 
assets. Based on these data, a crude substitution factor of 
40 percent was assumed. Thus, the credit projects explained ap-
proximately 28 percent of the net production increase rather 
than 67 percent. 
Econometric Studies 
Recent studies have used econometric techniques to analyze 
the impact of borrowing. Three different models have been used: 
a production function, an input demand function, and an effi-
ciency gap function. 
Production Function 
Colombian, Brazilian and Ghanian studies hypothesized that 
.~ ~ 
~ i 
I 
loans influence the farm production relationship [9, 13, 37, 21]. f 
l~ 
The credit variable was specified in several ways (Table 2). * 
The Colombian studies treated credit as a separate unit. The 
later Colombian study further hypothesized that borrowers have 
a completely different production technology so separate produc-
tion functions were estimated for borrower9, nonborrowers and 
borrowers prior to the supervised credit program. A modified 
Cobb-Douglas production model was used in the Brazilian model 
where credit was assumed to shift production coefficients for 
operating expenses, modern inputs, and machinery, but not for 
land, labor or animal power. Similarly, the Ghanian study as-
sumed all production parameters, except the intercept, were af-
fected by credit. The Ghanian study used time series aggregate 
data, while the others used cross section farm level data. 
• l 
TABLE 2: Estimates of the Effect of )3orrow1ng on the 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function, Selected Countrie;-; 
Colombia 
Borrower!!/ 
Non-
Item Colombia Borre.~-~ r Brazil Ghana 
1960 1965 1968 -1~T6a·- 1971772 1962-74 
Log a 1.174 2.899 0.740 1. 514 0.006 
Land 0. 303. 0.379* 0.777* o.418• 0. 293* -2.127 (1.620)!!/ (1.560) (3.964) (1.742) (4.42) (1.217) 
Labor 
-- 0. 396* 0.049 0.456* 0.009 4. 2481! ( 1.472) (0.383) (2.505) (0.88) (1.977) 
Farm Equipment -0.103-• 0.144 0.048 0.034 O.OIJ5* 
(-1. 873) (1.043) (0.533) (0.354) ( 1. 34) 
Livestock 
-- -- -- --
0.009* (1.83) 
Operating Expense 0 .115£.4 0.314* 0.279 1 O.IJ05* 0.246* 0.336 
(1.885) (1. 377) (1.898) (3.092) (4.30) (0.269) 
Modern Varieties 
-- -- -- -- 0.356* (5.02) 
Credit 0. 641" 0.064 -0.084 0.104* 
-- --(3.705) (0.877) (-1.000) (1.825) 
Credit x Land 
-- -- -- -- --
1. 559 (1.505) 
Credit x Labor 
-- -- -- -- --
-1.941 (-1.691) 
Credit x Operating 
-- -- --
0.0001* 
-0.395 
Exnense -- ( 1. 97) (-0.297) 
Creo1t x Modern Inputs 
-- -- -- -- -0.00003 
R2 
(-0.37) 
0.89 0.57 0.90 0.80 0.96 o.85 
Number of Observations 17 27 27 25 129 13 
a/ Borrowers are participants in supervised credit programs. Nonborrowers are non-
- participants including farmers borrowing from non-formal sources. 
b/ Figures in parenthesis are t-values. Asterisk indicates statistical si~ificance 
- at 10 percent or better confidence interval. 
£/ Includes fertilizer only. 
Sources: Colombia [9, 13), Brazil [33), and Ghana [21]. 
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These production function studies assume a somewhat differ-
ent role for borrowing than presented in the first section of 
this paper. Firsb, specifying credit as a separate production 
input presents a conceptual problem because loans may permit 
purchasing optimal input levels, but do not directly generate 
output. 
~% 
Double counting of inputs may also occur with credit as a' 
1 separate variable. An example exists with the. Colombian results 
where a higher production coefficient for credit was found in 
the earlier study. In this study the credit variable in effect 
captures the contribution of labor and other variables explicitly 
specified in the later model. 
Second, attributing differences in production functions 
between borrowers and nonborrowers to borrowing implicitly as-
sumes a relationship between source of liquidity and production 
function. A slight difference exists between borrowers and 
nonborrowers in the operating expense coefficient in the Colom-
bian and Brazilian studies, but not in coefficients for other 
inputs, such as mechanization and modern inputs, also expected 
to be influenced by loans. The direction of the differences, 
. however, is inconsistent. Insignificant coefficients in the 
Ghanian stµdy, except for the very high labor coefficient, 
probably reflects aggregation and specification problems. 
The somewhat unclear picture of loan impact is not surpris-
ing. Short-term credit programs attempt to encourage adoption 
of new seed-fertilizer technology, but there is little reason 
to expect adoption and, therefore, a shift in production function 
to be conditional upon borrowing. Modern varieties frequently 
i 
~L 
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imply greater operating expenses for optimal fertilizer and 
chemical use. However, seed costs are similar, fertilizer re-
sponse of modern varieties is usually higher at all levels of 
fertilization, and fertilizer is highly divisible. Therefore, 
farmers with varying financial constraints should simply be lo-
cated at different points on the modern technology function. 
Medium and long-term credit may be more closely associated with 
changes in the production relationship because these loans fre-
quently finance lumpy inputs more difficult to fund internally. 
For example, increasing farm size introduces scale economies; 
expanding irrigated area raises the productivity of fertilizer, 
land and modern varieties; and mechanization changes land-labor 
relations. 
The apparent difference in production coefficients between 
borrowers and nonborrowers, such as in land and labor in Colombia, 
may be due to omission of other inputs associated with loans like 
technical information or irrigation. Short-term loans would 
not be expected to have a major impact on these variables. A 
more plausible explanation is that progressive farmers with ir-
rigation and better technical information borrow more. Thus, 
causality is as likely from higher inputs, output, income, etc. 
to loans as it is from loans to these changes. 
Input Demand Function 
Input demand studies directly test the resource allocation 
model presented in the first section. Schluter's comprehensive 
7 < analysis of the impact of credit and uncertainty on resource 
allocation is an example. Input demand functions for labor, 
I. 
y 
~-
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modern varieties, fertilizer, crop area, and animal and machine 
power were estimated. The explanatory variables included finan-
cial constraints represented by credit availability and income; 
ability to bear risk, measured as nonfarm assets and farm size; 
technology and knowledge. No significant input and output 
price variations were assumed to exist across the farm sample. 
Table 3 presents Schluter's results only for modern varie-
ties and fertilizer, the main targets of supervised credit pro-
grams. Access to loans, dairying income, acreage cropped, and 
assets were significant explanatory variables for adoption of 
rice varieties and fertilizer use. Schluter regards assets and 
farm size as indices of farmers' ability to bear risk. Farmers 
more able to cope with uncertainty and with more access to in-
stitutional loans were more likely to adopt modern rice varie-
ties. Interestingly, these variables did not explain adoption 
of wheat varieties. Access to loans and technology (acreage 
in modern varieties) were the most significant factors explain-
ing fertilizer use. Access to loans appeared to be less impor-
tant, however, in explaining demand for other inputs not reported 
.in Table 3. 
Although the input demand approach does not directly test 
loan impact on farm production or income, it does avoid the 
conceptual problem of relating loans to the production function. 
The importance of borrowing in achieving optimal input use, 
however, can be better analyzed by developing a more appropriate 
measure of the opportunity cost of liquidity, e.g., effective 
cost of credit for borrowers and rate of return on next alternative 
·! 
i 
17 
TABLE 3: Linear Regression of Factors Affecting Use of Modern 
Rice and Wheat Varieties and Fertilizer in Surat 
District, India, 1971-72 
Credit.Q_/ 
Assets 
Non-Agricultural Income 
Dairying Income 
Acreage Under Crop d/ 
Gross Cropped Acreage 
Acreage Under Improved Rice 
Acreage Under Traditional Rice 
Acreage Under Unirrigated Crops 
Education 
R2 
Number of Observations 
Modern Varieties~/ 
Rice Wheat 
0.182* (2.02)Q.I 
0.020* 
(2.52) 
0.089 
( 1. 38) 
0.100 
( 1. 54) 
0.661* 
(6.59) 
-0.056* (-2.17) 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
0.76 
59 
-0.114 
(-1.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.89) 
-0.016 
(-1.28) 
0.073 
(l.53) 
0.541* 
(3.84) 
0.006 
(0.29) 
0.076* 
(3.23) 
0.74 
56 
Fertilizer 
82.676* 
(4.28) 
-0.585 (-0.34) 
8.575 (1.18) 
25.656* (2.49) 
66.998* (4.78) 
54.359 (2.48)* 
18.513* 
(2.50) 
-8.991 (-0.89) 
-5.129 
(-0.97) 
0.63 
25 
~/Two other variables, number of family workers and home consump-
tion requirements were included in these equations but were not 
statistically significant. 
b/Refers to maximum amount the cooperative would be willing to 
lend the farmer for variable inputs -based on acreage, cropping 
pattern, assets, and character of the farmer. 
£/Figures in parentheses are t-value. Asterisk indicates sig-
nificance at 1 percent level. 
£/For fertilizer, this represents acreage under high yielding 
rice varieties. 
* Statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: [35]. 
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use of liquidity, instead of the usual dummy variable representa-
tion of borrowing or borrowing limits. 
Efficiency Gap Function 
The third econometric approach relates credit not directly 
to input levels but to the farmer's ability to efficiently allo-
cate resources. These studies attempt to determine if loans ex-
plain differences in ability to use optimum levels of inputs. Some 
studies simply compare whether borrowers and nonborrowers equate 
prices of inputs to marginal value products for inputs frequently 
financed by loans [29, 33]. Separate production functions are 
estimated for borrowers and nonborrowers but differences in ini-
tial level of savings, managerial ability, and perception of 
risk are usually not considered. A Malaysian study is an excep-
tion as farmers were classified by capital availability index, 
rather than borrower and nonborrower, to correct for differences 
in financial constraint [12]. 
A study by Mandac and Herdt was mainly concerned with iden-
tifying efficiency constraints on Philippine rice farms, but it 
represents an alternative approach to measure loan impact. They 
used a unique data set including production activities from nor-
mal farming operations as well as from experimental trials con-
ducted on the farmers' same fields. Measures of technical ver-
sus allocative inefficiencies were identified for each farm.~/ 
8/ Farrel distinguished technical from allocative efficiency. A 
technically efficient farmer operates on.the frontier produc-
tion function. Allocative efficiency refers to equating mar-
ginal value product to input price. 
19 
Level of technical knowledge, and environmental factors such as 
irrigation and soil fertility were expected to influence techni-
cal efficiency, while managerial ability, uncertainty and per-
ception of risk, financial constraints, and credit availability 
would likely affect allocative efficiency. 
Table 4 reports the regression analysis explaining differ-
ences in allocative efficiency among sample farms. Considering 
the cross section nature of the data and the measurement problems 
in estimating efficiency, a remarkably high percentage of varia-
tion in efficiency was explained by the model. Most of the sig-
nificant variables are measures of financial constraint--total 
area, gross family income, and credit--and the signs of the co-
efficients were as expected. Farm size reduces supply of liquid 
capital per hectare, while family income and credit increases 
the supply. The highly significant coefficient for irrigation 
indicates the importance of risk factors in farmer decisions. 
Variables reflecting farmers' knowledge seem to be relatively 
less critical, although the information index and days worked 
off-farm had significant coefficients. 
Efficiency gap models are conceptually appealing and 
future analysis can be extended to estimate loan impact on farm 
production or income. However, use of-experimental data to es-
tablish the frontier production function and thus distinguish 
~ technical vs. price efficiency is rarely possible. In many 
cases, farm practices of the "best" farmers may have to be used 
as in other empirical studies of technical efficiency [42]. 
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TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Variation in 
Allocative Efficiency Among Philippine Rice Farmers 
Variable Coefficient 
Intercept 
Intercept Dummy Variables 
Credit (l=nonborrowers) 
Labor Scarcity (l=scarce labor) 
Tenancy (l=share tenant) 
Irrigation (l=unirrigated) 
Risk Index (l=higher risk) 
Gross Family Income 
Total Area 
Information Index 
Age of Farmer Operator 
Years of Education 
Number of Days Worked Off Farm 
Technical Knowledge Score 
R2 = ,77 
n = 336 (56 farmers from wet season of 
1974 to dry season of 1977) 
1. 7490 
-0. 4 369* 
0.0249 
-0.2836 
-0.0075* 
-0.1302 
0.00003* 
-3.0731* 
0.1713* 
-0.0091 
-0.2418 
0.0026* 
0. 0 39 7 
t-value 
-2.1260 
0.0913 
-0.8203 
-3.2051 
-0.6500 
3.0000 
-9.5497 
1.8013 
-1.0225 
-1.2002 
2.0813 
0.4091 
*Statistically significant at 10 percent level or higher. 
SOURCE: r 2(]. 
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Programming Studies 
Several studies of loan impact and demand have used some 
type of mathematical programming. Part of the attraction is that 
these studies provide estimates of normative behavior; that is, 
they suggest what farmers should do to achieve a goal specified 
in the model's objective function. Therefore, they are frequently 
used to simulate the impact of alternative policy changes. 
Modelling Alternatives 
Table 5 lists examples of the evolution in programming 
studies dealing with some aspect of agricultural finance. Single 
period linear models are most commonly used. Typically, a rep-
resentative model is developed for reasonably homogeneous farms 
with respect to size, enterprises, technology, resource endow-
ment and other characteristics. Profit maximization is normally 
assumed, subject to maximum and minimum farm and/or household 
constraints. The activities included represent what exists or 
what is expected under alternative scenarios. Formal and infor-
mal loan sources supplement internal funds to finance operating 
costs .. 
Multi-period models, with and without discounting future 
cash flows, provide important advantages for the study of impact 
of loans on investment, firm growth and liquidity management. 
First, monthly or seasonal constraints for borrowing or consump-
tion may be specified within a model for a longer planning hori-
zon. Sales activities can also be incorporated to furnish funds 
for the capital constraint. Second, periods can be linked to 
show how current activities influence future activities. Third, 
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TABl.I 5: ~r18t1ca ~ Selected lesults of M3.them.t1cal. Progranming Studies of Agrl.cUltural Credit 
Authors & Study ctljective Selected~el 
Study Area ~~ectives F\Jnction Characteristics 
SIN<LE F£RIOD LmEAR ]l{)l)ELS: 
A~al & 
Kurrawat; 
Rajasthan, 
India 
Patrick; 
N.E. Brazil 
Whitaker, 
et al.; 
IN CORA 
borrowers, 
Colorrbia 
White; 
Minas 
Gerais, 
Brazil 
Estirrate credit 
requlrerrenti; of 
new technology 
Analyze possible 
effect of govern-
rrent policies 
Analyze inpact 
of credit 
program 
Analyze regl~al 
deve lopl'ent 
potential 
l.fJLTIPIE PERIOD I.INF.AR l'Q:E[.'): 
Ahrred; Analyze supply-
Gezira., & derrand for 
Sudan credit 
Alexander; Analyze policy al-
West Java, ternatives for 
Indonesia Birras program 
P..Y:er & Analyze llquldl ty 
~kir!'jiVlii nnnagerrent 
lit tar 
Pradesh, 
India 
Hadiwlgeno; Analyze effect 
East Java, of changes in 
Indonesia credit policy 
Max:1lllize net 
fann :lncone 
~ze net 
farm incorre 
Ml.ximize 
profits or 
production 
Mlximize 
net fann 
inccne 
!lb.x1m1ze 
profits 
Maximize net 
farm incorre 
113.ximize farm 
returns plus 
values of 
cash & credit 
reserves 
Maxlm1ze farm 
net incorre 
plus value of 
cash & credit 
reserves 
Three fann size groups; -wet & dry 
seasons; sinJ.llations with & without 
fornal credit and new technology 
Various sizes; three counties; 
crops & livestock; sinulation 
of alternat1 ve technologies, 
fertilizer & crop prices, land 
purchase, & interest rates 
'l'l«!lve technology classes of 
fartIB; corn enterprises only; 
sinulations with & without 
credit, and with & without 
credit tied to inputs 
'l'l«!lve typical fann situations; 
crop & ll vestock; sinulated tech-
nology, borrowing 11ml.ts, interest 
rates & specialized credit program 
Six farm types; 24 semi-l![)f}thly 
perlcxb; m1n111l.un conswipt1on car 
stra.1nts; production & narketing; 
pararreterized interest rates & 
(JCI'I".)wing limits 
Six farm types by liquidity & Eize; 
consUl!f't1 on constraints; off-fann 
business cpeclfied; three crop 
seasons; f"U'a1ll2ler17.ed interest 
rates, credit allocation rules, 
payback period & credit in-kind 
Srrall farm; wr:t & dry !1eason; mini-
mum <.:rop & cash I'L"'quircrrenls; re-
serve values for cash & credit 
Srrall farrrs 1n four vill~s; one 
year planning horizon; six seasons; 
padi & other annual" crops; minimum 
household pati; sinulated changes 
1n Birras c red1 t 
Financlal Conponent 
Initial cash balance; op-
erating credit borrowing 
limits 
Cperating & lnvestirent 
credit from fornal 
sources 
Working capital 
borrowing limits 
~rating & investrrent 
crL"dit f'rum fornal 
sources 
Initial cash c<Xlstralnt; 
formal & inforanl credit 
Borrowing & sav1ngl acti-
vities; borrowing limits 
for each type of credit 
[~,rrowtnr: !'rum noncy-
lcnders & snull famer 
credit program; para-
rreterlzed cash & liquidity 
requlrcrrents 
Borrowing f'ran noney-
lender, bank & Bimas 
program 
Illuatrat1ve Fesults 
. ~t!Jrun t<ll'ID plans. With - . . 
existing technology require 
borrowing; boITCMing require-
nents sharply increase with 
new technology 
Reductions in fertilizer 
prices & interest rates had 
little ilrpact except on 
incorre distribution 
Worldng capital ls a con-
straint; IlJCORA loans had 
slgp.ificant lnpact on 
profits, production, factor 
use & technological c~ 
Borrowing capacity limited 
adoption of technology; 
results insensitive to 
:Interest rates 
Borrowing required to reach 
optirrurn incorre; increased 
interest rates had little 
effect on incone 
Interest rates could be 
raised to 5% per rrorith with 
little effect on borrowlng; 
lncrea:;ing c1.::dl t cn~t 
altered rrarket 1ng prnctlces 
M:.xlels wit.ti l'C':·,l~r\'{.~S con-
cept approxlnate farner 
plans; reliable sources of 
small farm::r credit incr'Ca.se 
output & incone 
Changed terms for Binrul 
loans, affected rra.llieting; 
little effect or: production; 
little effect of increased 
interest rate 
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. !IJLTIPIP. PERIOD LINEAR MX£I.S (DISCX>lJm:D P\1l'IJ!E JNCXH:): 
Dean & 
Benedictis; 
Southern 
Italy 
Naseem; 
Punjab, 
Pakistan 
Analyze opt:l.m.un 
investrrent 
behavior 
Analyze effect 
or govemrrent 
policies on 
growth 
Maxim1ze dis..; 
col.D1ted future 
net farm 
incorre 
Max1m1ze dis-
counted :ruture 
net faxm 
in cone 
MULTIPLE PERIOD RECURSIVE LINEAR llOIEIB: 
Day & Analyze agricul- Jlhximize 
Sin!!tJ; tural transfer- regional 
Punjab, mt ion net farm 
India prof.I.ts 
each year 
Heidhtes; Analyze policy Maximize 
Northern alternative net farm 
Oenmny effect on firm returns 
growth each year 
Sin!!tl & Analyze regional Maxim1ze 
Ahn; developrrent regional 
Rio Grande process net farm 
do Sul, incooe 
Brazil 
smGIE PflUOD QUADRATIC K>IEI.'l: 
Peres; Estillate derived Min1mize V8l"-
Sao Paulo, del!Bl'ld for c:redit iance of 
Brazil under risk and farm incooe 
inflation 
Schluter; Analyze cropping M1nim1ze rean 
Surat pattern absolute de-
District viation of 
India cash 1ncone 
(MJl'AD) 
Soares; Determ1Ile opti- M1niml.ze 
Northeast mum resource use variance of 
Brazil under l"isk farm incorre 
Sr.all farm; 60 year plaming period; 
annual & orchard crq>s; exo~nous 
consU11Ption requirerrents 
Small farm; four year planning 
rrodel; winter & sUllllEr seasons; 
sinulated borrowing lim1.ts, sav-
ings rates, interest rates, pro-
duct prices & farm size 
Regional l!Ddel; :regional cash & 
cOnsUllJltion constraints; feedback 
constraints; historic behavior 
1952-1965; projections to 1980 
Eleven farm size-types; year 
planning period; feedback con-
straints; sillulated grain & 
milk prices 
Three farn! size node ls; crops 
& livestock; 10 year period; 
feedback constraints; sinulated 
alternative credit & price 
policies 
Snall an:1 l~ farm m:xiels; crops 
& livestock; price expectation 
l!Ddel; paraneterized interest 
rates & labor· supply 
Typical fanm; irr11?Pted & non-
irr11?Pted farms; annual crops; 
m1n1rrLun consU111Jtion constraints; 
paraneterized family size; fann 
size; w~ rates & interest rates 
Large farms; one cropping season; 
sin1Jle & inter-planted crops; 
sharecropping; paraneterized 
technology, cotton prices, wages, 
labor supply, borrowing liml.ts 
GoverruIEnt production 
grantg & inte:rest subsi-
dies; s:i discount rate 
Borrowing & savings 
activities 
Borrowing & savings ac-
tivities; credit tied 
to gross sales; operat-
1ng & investDEnt credit 
Several 11Dney & capital 
constraints; investirent 
& savings activities 
Operating & 1nvestrrent 
credit from fonmJ. 
sources 
Initial savings; borrowing 
11m1ts for credit for 
l!Ddern inputs & general 
expenses 
Savings & borrowings from 
11D11eylender & cooperative; 
borrowing limits for forne.l 
& infernal credit 
Cash constraints; fomal 
credit 
Rapid conversion to orchards 
with/without grants; a dis-
count rate of 16% would lead 
to annual crop p~uctioo 
Credit constrains full use 
of resources; farners would 
borrow triple initial credit 
availability at prevailing 
interest rates; shift to 
hi@tler-value crops & L'!Proved 
technology with credit 
Inc:reas1ng internal finance 
over tire; elasticity of 
dermnd for loanable ftl1dS 
increases 
Investrents lower on farms 
with reduced internal 
finance 
Derived denand for credit 
showed increasL'lg elasti-
city over tirre; slll3.1.l fa.."'lllS 
were relatively insensitive 
to interest rates 
Actual borrowing;s exceeded 
predicted for slll3.1.l farms, 
while large fa.ms borrowed 
less than predicted 
C:redit was required for 
production of higtl-incorre 
crops; interest rate had 
little effect 
Fifty percent reduction 
in formal credit bor-
rowing limit reduced 
sharecropping & farr.! in-
corre, while increasing 
incooe variance 
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future cash flows can be discounted to account for the time pre-
ference of consumption when the planning horizon is several 
In addition,· some specific issues have been studied with 
multi-period models. For example, Boehlje and White compared 
results of maximization of income versus net worth. Baker and 
Bhargava and Hadiwigeno tested how the value of unused cash and 
credit could influence liquidity management.21 If the value of 
credit reserves is high, farmers may engage in internal credit 
rationing and borrow less than the full borrowing limit. Like-
wise, when the reserve value of cash is high, farmers may borrow 
even while holding cash. 
Recursive models have been used to model both representa-
tive farms and agricultural regions. Unlike other multi-period 
models, the objective function is solved each year with the re-
sults for one period linked to previous periods by feedback con-
straints. These constraints are specified to reflect farmer be-
havior, such as accounting for risk aversion by safety first ob-
jectives [39]. Some tests exist for verifying model results 
relative to historical experience [18]. Another feature of re-
gional models is farm size decomposition to test competition for 
resources, such as a fixed regional credit constraint, among dif-
ferent size farms [39]. 
Another approach to treating risk exists with quadratic 
models used to generate EV frontiers relating expected income 
21 Recently, a similar analysis was conducted by Tewari and Sharma· 
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to income variance. Farmer behavior usually approximates some 
point along the frontier where income and capital requirements 
are somewhat less and enterprise combinations more diversified 
than obtained with profit maximization. 
Two types of analyses are frequently conducted in program-
ming studies. The first is similar to the before-after approach 
discussed earlier. Solutions of models without loans or with 
only informal loans are compared with solutions specifying bor-
rowing limits for formal loans. This approach conforms with 
the resource allocation model discussed in the first section 
where loans are expected to influence input usage. The second 
an2lysis involves parameterizing the interest rate for formal 
loans to determine levels and elasticity of loan demand. 
Several similar results emerge from these studies. Tech-
nological change, adoption of new varieties and cropping systems, 
mechanization and farm income are frequently found to be con-
strained by current formal loan supplies. Borrowing limits must 
be relaxed to obtain socially desired changes in these variables. 
Likewise, evaluations of credit programs conclude that formal 
loans have resulted in desirable farm changes. Furthermore, 
productive alternatives exist so farmers could pay substantially 
higher interest rates with limited reduction in borrowings. 
Small farms appear particularly insensitive to interest rates. 
Methodological Problems 
The similarity of research results would normally suggest 
conclusi~e evidence on these issues. Several methodological 
26 
issues, however, require caution in interpretation. The actual 
or expected impact of borrowing or demand for loans may te sub-
stantially under or overestimated in a particular study because 
of several reasons. First, few studies attempt to capture the 
full complexity of farm household behavior. Model activities 
are largely limited to the farm and only Alexander included 
10/ 
the allocation of household resourcesto off-farm business.~ 
Since loan funds are fungible, the true impact of loans for 
production purposes is hard to determine without an integrated 
household model. Furthermore, savings behavior should be tied 
to production possibilities so a fixed level of savings should 
be inappropriate when technology changes. 
Second, many studies focus on working capital. In many 
countries, little long-term credit exists. Therefore, short-
term loans are borrowed in excess of working capital needs to 
help finance investment. Thus the impact of short-term loans 
must be considered in relation to investment, not just production 
as is normal. 
Third, true costs and benefits of borrowing may not be ade-
quately captured by interest rates and borrowing limlts. Borrowing 
costs, especially for small farmers, may far exceed interest 
rates [l]. Also, the reliability of the credit source, expecta-
tions about the need to repay, and nondredit services will influence 
the extent to which a borrower will switch from an informal to a 
formal source or borrow rather than use savings [8]. 
10/ Bishop appears to be one of the first to analyze nonfarrn ac-
tivities. 
l 
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Fourth, in spite of subsistence constraints, valuation of 
reserves, safety first constraints, quadratic programming, etc., 
' 
it is not clear that research has adequately dealt with risk and 
uncertainty. If credit were priced at equilibrium rates, repay-
ment expected, and farmer attitudes toward risk adequately cap-
tured, optimum borrowing might be significantly less than esti-
mated. 
Fifth, compared to some other methodologies, mathematical pro-
gramming models offer fewer possibilities for statistical tests 
of goodness of fit. In this review, only two publications dealt 
with model validation in any detail [18, 39]. Some models may 
be so tightly constrained with (sometimes) arbitriry constraints 
that few feasible solutions are possible. Thus it is not clear 
if farmer behavior has really been captured by the models. If 
not, projections are dubious. 
Finally, this review would not be complete without reference 
to the applicability of these models to many low income countries. 
Many sophisticated models have been developed in developed 
countries. Few low income countries have sufficient data, com-
puter capability and staff to use these models. 
SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper has addressed methodological problems in analyz-
ing the micro level impact of loans. The first section reviewed 
the farm resource allocation model explicitly or implicitly under-
lying much research. The second section reviewed selected ex-
, amples of empirical research. Many studies are largely descriptive 
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and are more useful in generating hypotheses than in rigorously 
assessing loan impact. The more analytical econometric and 
mathematical programming studies are relatively few, are confined 
to a few countries, and also have methodological problems. 
Three important methodological issues were identified. 
First, most studies use the farm as the basic unit of analysis. 
Little attention is given to the interdependence of production 
and consumption activities typical in most farm-households in 
low income countries. This shortcoming is sometimes justified t ; 
by the explicit goals of agricultural credit programs of increas- l 
ing farm production, but also may be due to inherent complexity 
of conceptualizing a broader framework and the traditional sep-
aration of production and consumption theory in neoclassical 
economics. 
Secondly, and related to the first, few studies recognize 
the fungibility of money. Borrowed funds enter the household's 
total cash resources and become indistinguishable from other 
funds. Funds ostensibly obtained for farm production may result 
in additionality in consumption_or nonfarm activities. A narrow 
focus on farm analysis will tend to understate the credit impact 
on farm-household welfare and fungibility creates difficulties 
in assessing this bias. 
Third, most studies have not adequately resolved the attri-
bution problem, that is, separate the effect of loans from other 
factors simultaneously affecting farm production, yields, income, 
etc. Differences in output and input prices, production technol-
ogy, and managerial_constraints may all contribute to differences 
• I ,..it 
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found between borrowers and non-borrowers or before and after 
borrowing. Especially important is nonprice rationing of credit 
resulting in concentrafion of loans to larger, well-established, 
richer farmers. Thus, differences between farmers may explain 
credit allocation rather than the impact of borrowing. 
Future research on rural finance will improve as researchers 
develop greater appreciation for the issues raised in this paper 
--in~erdependence of farm-household decision-making, fungibility, 
and attribution. The input demand and efficiency gap econometric 
models illustrate potential analytical approaches for measuring 
lean impact that minimize the attribution problem. Likewise, 
so;:.2 of the recent programming models attempt to capture more 
of farm household complexity and interdependencies. New method-
ological approaches using a integrated farm-houshole framework 
of production and input demand and supply analysis have not been 
explored extensively for financial studies [26]. 
The immediate priority is to develop a data base sufficient 
for more detailed analysis of agricultural finance. Fungibility 
and farm-household decision-making indicate the need for collect-
ing comprehensive data on sources and uses of farm household 
liquidity. All sources of liquidity need to be quantified and 
related to the various farm and hous~hold uses. Careful monitor- -
ing of production expenses, investment, consumption and nonfarm 
activities is necessary to accurately describe when and where 
additional liquidity is allocated. Once described, more rigorous 
• 
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analysis can be used to identify factors explaining allocation 
and impact of loans. Massive cross section surveys currently 
undertaken in many countries are not suitable for this purpose. 
Much more emphasis is required in carefully collecting longi-
tudinal data, particularly from panel households, even at the 
expense of smaller sample size. 
Finally, the ultimate objective of agricultural credit 
policies and programs should be to improve rural welfare. Al-
though the benefits and shortcomings of credit are frequently 
enumerated, they have not been systematically related to the 
costs of other policy instruments to meet the objectives includ-
ing input or product price policy, irrigation development, re-
search and extension, and so forth. We suspect such an analysis 
would reveal that agricultural credit programs are less cost 
effective, but are preferred because of ease in administration, 
facility with which rich politically powerful farmers can manip-
ulate them, and ability to absorb large sums of money thereby 
assisting aid agencies to meet· lending quotas. 
t 
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